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ABSTRACT 
The public policy approach to the Internet has become more and more 
complex as several markets – including fixed and mobile communications, 
media and content, IT – converge into one single Internet ecosystem. As in 
all ecosystems, zones and domains depend on each other, and there is no 
possibility of touching one layer without affecting all others. This paper 
reflects on the economics of the Internet and emerging business models, 
and comments on the current debates in each of the layers of modern all-
IP architectures, from the unbundling of network elements to net 
neutrality and the emerging discussion on search neutrality. The paper 
concludes that the trend towards ex ante regulation of several Internet 
services, if not stopped, may extend also to sectors that are still in their 
infancy, such as cloud computing. Finally, the paper suggests that 
antitrust laws and current regulatory frameworks for e-communications, 
in particular in Europe, should reflect the economics of all-IP broadband 
platforms. This implies, i.a., strengthening the role of countervailing buyer 
power across layers of the Internet, adopting a layered approach to 
policymaking and establishing co-regulatory solutions to bridge the 
informational gap between policymakers and market players.  
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raditionally, the debate on telecoms and internet regulation has focused 
mostly on access policy at the infrastructure layer (since the 1980s), as 
well as net neutrality on the logical layer (in the past five years). 
However, despite the huge amount of literature available on these issues, for 
neither of them the last word has been said on which policy approach is likely to 
favor consumers and increase consumer welfare2. What‘s more, while 
economists and policymakers strive to find solutions to existing problems, the 
world changes so rapidly that new and even more complex policy issues surface. 
Like Achilles chasing the tortoise in Zeno‘s famous paradox of motion, attempts 
to grasp the market dynamics and translate them into policy are doomed to be 
frustrated by the constant evolution of networks and economic interactions in 
cyberspace, to the extent that some observers have suggested the ―impossibility 
of public policy‖ – and hence, the inevitability of laissez faire – in cyberspace, 
whereas others believe in a world of ―regulatory pantheism‖ or ―regulated 
freedom‖, where every layer of the Internet if subject to strict rules with the aim 
of forcing openness3.   
The increased complexity of the subject matter is evident in the net neutrality 
debate. Most of the pro-neutrality arguments depend on the fundamental belief 
that in cyberspace market power can emerge only at the infrastructure layer. 
The debate features sometimes-apocalyptic scenarios, in which ISPs are seen as 
potentially dictating the rules of the Internet by discriminating between 
applications or even blocking apps or content, and thus transforming the 
Internet into a walled garden. In the United States, this recently culminated in 
the debate over the FCC‘s alleged competence over broadband as 
                                                   
1  Senior Research Fellow, Head of Regulatory Affairs, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels (Belgium); Professor of Antitrust and Regulation, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome (Italy). 
2    
3   
T 
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 4 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
telecommunications services, rather than information services under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. The issue – emerged after the FCC ruling against 
Comcast in 20084 – is far from trivial: only if broadband is considered to belong 
to services covered by Title II of the 1996 Act, the FCC may claim that common 
carriage obligations apply, including the prohibition of engaging in ―any unjust 
or unreasonable discrimination‖5: but the FCC itself – later backed by the 
Supreme Court – ruled in 2002 that Internet services provided by cable 
companies should be classified as information services and hence not subject to 
Title II regulations6. The FCC then confirmed this approach for wireless 
Internet services in 20077; however, today the same authority is trying to affirm 
its ―ancillary competence‖ over these services based on Title II, in order to be 
able to control anticompetitive and non-neutral behavior by ISPs. Recent talks 
with the industry have reportedly failed, as FCC Chairman Genachowsky 
recently announced that he had called off stakeholder discussions since they 
have not led to ―a robust framework to preserve the openness and freedom of 
the Internet – one that drives innovation, investment, free speech, and 
consumer choice‖8 
At the same time, the recent joint legislative proposal filed by Verizon and 
Google has been interpreted by many commentators as a step towards a two-
tiered Internet where fast tracks will be made available to those that can pay for 
them – and indeed, some commentators think this is not a first-best scenario. In 
addition, the same proposal hints at the need to treat wireless platforms 
differently, and this too has already split the public opinion into two, equally 
aggressive and opinionated groups9.   
In Europe, the issue is apparently less complex, since the regulatory framework 
is technology-neutral and the competence of antitrust authorities to scrutinize 
ex post the conduct of ISPs is undisputed. Contrary to the FCC in the US, the 
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European Commission and all national competition authorities in the EU27 can 
intervene in regulated fields to challenge allegedly anticompetitive conduct10. 
Still, the debate on net neutrality has permeated also the European debate 
during the review of the regulatory framework for e-communications, initially 
linked to the need to provide ISPs with adequate incentives to invest in high-
speed telecom networks, and later as a priority for developing a pro-consumer 
Internet policy in Europe. For example, the new Commissioner for the Digital 
Agenda Neelie Kroes recently stated that ―Open and clear cut net neutrality is 
needed‖, and that ―new threats to Net Neutrality which can arise from many 
sources, and blocking and discrimination against VoIP services by mobile 
operators in a number of European countries are just one example‖. Kroes also 
stated that ―[t]he core issue is whether Internet access providers and broadband 
providers should be able to exercise control and limit users‘ access to any 
content‖, clarifying that this should be possible only ―for security reasons or 
when spam is involved; (if it's for) commercially motivated reasons, that's not 
net neutrality‖11. More recently, however, in launching a wide public 
consultation on net neutrality, Kroes also stated that ―that we should avoid 
taking unnecessary measures which may hinder new efficient business models 
from emerging‖, and used a road traffic analogy to explain that ―creating new 
rules and crowding the street with signs does not automatically help the traffic 
to flow. Indeed, putting a police officer at a busy corner can often deliver the 
slowest traffic of all‖12. 
Implicitly, and regardless of the specific content of these statements, all this 
emphasis suggests that the only gatekeepers of cyberspace are and will always 
be ISPs. However, the Internet is evolving in a way that generates market power 
(better, ―gate-keeping‖ power) also at higher layers, including the logical, 
application and even the content layer. Irrespective of whether the asset 
controlled by the gatekeeper is tangible (like access to the telecoms network) or 
intangible (such as a search engine, a dominant application, or a private cloud), 
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the layered architecture of cyberspace is such that discrimination and 
exceptions to the basic Internet freedoms may emerge at all layers. This is why 
concepts such as ―search neutrality‖, ―application neutrality‖ or ―cloud 
neutrality‖ are likely to become more widespread in the years to come, and 
evolve into a comprehensive ―platform neutrality‖ argument.  
Accordingly, the past few months have witnessed an expansion of neutrality 
claims into previously unknown territories. In some cases, past advocates of 
access policy and net neutrality are seeing their stances backfiring in the form of 
regulatory proposals or antitrust investigations. IT companies have filed 
different accusations against Google for abuse of market power13; commentators 
have argued that search neutrality is becoming at least as important as net 
neutrality14; and bloggers around the world anticipate that cloud computing 
desperately needs neutrality and interoperability regulations15. All in all, there is 
enough to conclude that Internet regulation is contagious: as in the Sorcerer‘s 
Apprentice, getting started is easy, controlling is tough, and stopping the whole 
thing impossible.  
This paper attempts to frame these phenomena in economic terms to suggest 
policy approaches that may prove suitable to help the Internet remain as open, 
rich, competitive, dynamic and inclusive as possible. Section 1 begins by 
describing the basic architecture of cyberspace and the emerging business 
models in the cloud computing era. Section 2 illustrates the main policy 
challenges related to the gateways of cyberspace, from the telecoms-IT interface 
to net neutrality, search neutrality and eventually cloud computing. Section 3 
concludes by looking at future policy directions and provides hints on how to 
avoid that the winner take-all game that characterizes several layers of 
cyberspace ends up leads to a winner‘s curse due to an overflow of regulation. 
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1 THE BASIC ARCHITECTURE AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSPACE 
The past decade has witnessed a transition in the telecoms and IT fields, which 
can be described as a multiple convergence scenario, including a blurring of the 
boundaries (and increased competition) between fixed and mobile 
communications, but also convergence between the telecommunications and 
the IT and media domains, and convergence between the infrastructure layer 
and higher layers of all-IP networks. More in detail: 
 Convergence between fixed and mobile telecommunications is finally 
becoming a reality. This is certainly happening, though slowly, in Europe, as 
confirmed by a recent decision adopted by the European Commission, which 
authorised the definition of a common fixed-mobile relevant market for 
retail broadband in Austria16. The Commission recalled that ―[…] fixed and 
mobile retail broadband services are normally not belonging to the same 
market. However, on the basis of the following circumstances closely related 
to the specificity of the Austrian market, the Commission accepts the 
inclusion of mobile and broadband connections into the retail residential 
market for the purposes of the present notification.‖ Further prospects in 
this direction came from a recent document jointly elaborated by the BEREC 
and the Radio Spectrum Policy Group, which discusses the main conditions 
for defining joint fixed-mobile markets17. The use of femtocells and the 
remarkable speed of imminent 4G networks suggests that the 
substitutability between fixed and mobile broadband access will be on the 
increase in the months to come. Recent reports and academic papers 
confirms this trend18.  
 Convergence between telecommunications and IT is fully realized by the 
migration towards an all-IP infrastructure, which is bringing new business 
models, the creation of multi-layered platforms where applications and 
                                                   
16    
17   
18   
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 8 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
services dominate user experience, and constantly changing competitive 
dynamics. Not only fixed broadband platforms are increasingly integrated 
into the Internet, but cloud computing is shifting most of the computing 
capacity into centralised storage servers, which will be made accessible from 
both fixed and mobile devices. The success of the App stores created by 
Apple and Google Android promises to revolutionise also the way in which 
we use computers, not only smartphones. This form of convergence is 
triggering also convergence between the infrastructure layer and higher 
layers of all-IP architectures, such as the logical layer, the application layer 
and the content layer in the (simplified) OSI representation (see Section 1.1 
below).  
 Convergence between the media world and the Internet world is disrupting 
traditional business models in the content industry, leading to a growing 
unbundling and re-aggregation of content in different formats and in more 
online-user-friendly ways. This has led to a significant shift of users‘ 
attention from traditional media to Internet-published news, which in turn 
shifted advertising investment and market power to online content 
aggregators. As will be explained in Section 2 below, this is particularly 
important since control of advertising revenues is a key success factor for 
modern broadband platforms, and is also currently a very concentrated 
market, which led antitrust. Authorities in some legal systems to start 
investigating the extent of competition and market openness in this domain.  
Below, we explore the consequence of this multiple transition in terms of the 
emergence of the Internet ecosystem, as well as in economic terms.  
1.1 Exploring the ecosystem 
As stated, i.a. in OECD (2009), with convergence broadband platforms become 
much more than simple communications networks, and can be considered as 
ecosystems that comprise ―different elements that use high-speed connectivity 
to interact in different ways‖19. In these ecosystems, competitive dynamics have 
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become way more complex than used to be the case back when the telecoms 
sector resembled a traditional network industry, mostly posing problems of 
third-party access and liberalization. The foundations of unbundling policy 
become even more shaky when we look at the features of emerging markets, for 
the reasons explained in this section.  
The term ―ecosystem‖ refers to the combined physical and biological 
components of an environment20. When applied to the Internet, this term refers 
to all the hardware and software that composes the Internet, plus the various 
players that populate the Internet environment and the complex web of rules 
and relations that affect them. This also means that the Internet ecosystem 
includes both the physical architecture and cyberspace. A recently proposed 
image of the Internet ecosystem is depicted below.  
 
Figure 1 – An image of the Internet ecosystem 
 
Source: the Internet Society (2010) 
In this paper, I deal with a sub-set of the several actors that populate this 
ecosystem, which indeed forms the core of the economic activities taking place 
in cyberspace. In this domain, one of the most important features of the 
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Internet ecosystem is its layered architecture, which exists since the early days 
of ARPANET, which later evolved into the Internet as we know it today. Figure 2 
below shows the various layers of the Internet ecosystem in the classical OSI 
form. The transition towards the layered environment – something that some 
experts have informally summarised as the transition from the ―spaghetti‖ to 
the ―lasagna‖ model of the value chain – triggers a number of interesting 
developments, which in my opinion have not been fully digested by policy 
analysts and public decision-makers.  
 First, the emerging substitutability between fixed and mobile has a direct 
effect on the nature of essential facility often attached to the incumbent‟s 
fixed network. Even when reasonably substitutable fixed networks are not 
available, the existence of wireless solutions that fall in the same relevant 
market clashes with one of the conditions for a finding of essential facilities, 
i.e. the impossibility to technically or economically replicate the service. 
Absent this lack of replicability, unbundling seems to be way less justified.  
 Second, the assessment of market power is becoming increasingly complex 
due to (i) ―horizontal‖ competition coming from players that operate in the 
same relevant market of the fixed-line incumbents (facilities-based cable or 
fibre entrants, wireless broadband operators, consortia of municipalities, 
etc.); (ii) ―vertical‖, ―intra-platform‖ competitive pressure exerted from 
players that provide competing services in a nomadic way (e.g. Skype of 
Google voice for VoIP services); and ―inter-platform‖ competition by players 
that propose themselves as platform operators, even if they come from 
different relevant markets (e.g. Apple‘s iPhone or iPad, Google Android, 
Nokia Ovi, and other nascent platforms). The literature has brilliantly 
summarised these dynamics of competition – and especially the latter one – 
by referring to ―competition for eyeballs‖, which is animated by competing 
platforms that try to conquer the attention (and the bill) of the end user: 
cloud computing can do nothing but exacerbate this form of competition, 
with several private cloud managers offering closed, semi-open or fully open 
cloud services.  
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 A related, procedural problem for regulators and competition authorities is 
how to define the relevant market. The links between system layers and the 
lack of fully interoperable standards creates hidden provinces in cyberspace, 
where substitutability between platforms or platform ―complementors‖ is 
indeed limited, warranting narrow market definitions. Antitrust authorities 
have already had their way into this quagmire. For example, in the US 
Microsoft case the relevant market for Intel-compatible Operating Systems 
was considered as separate from the relevant market for Mac-compatible 
OS. The FTC went even further in a famous case, Intel v. Intergraph, by 
defining Intel as a monopolist for Intel processors, something that should at 
least have rung a bell. The fact that in the ICT world, ―the license is the 
product‖21, and ―the product can become the market‖22 suggests that the 
notion of relevant market, interpreted the way we have done outside the ICT 
world, may become completely useless in this field.  
 Fourth, it is now widely acknowledged that modern broadband platforms 
exhibit the features of two-sided, or better multi-sided markets. No player 
can succeed to conquer the attention of new users in those markets without 
good network connectivity, a large participation of application and content 
providers, one or more compatible device producers, and of course an 
established population of users23. This peculiarity creates, i.a. also problems 
in terms of the selection of appropriate remedies. In particular, cost-based 
pricing is in most cases inappropriate for these types of markets24, and even 
asymmetric regulation as a whole can create problems, since behaviours that 
may be erroneously considered as monopolization strategies are in fact 
replicated by all players in the market, regardless of their market power. 
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Figure 2 – Main layers of an all-IP platform ADDING EVEN ORE COMPLEXITY
11
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(e.g. web pages, audiovisual content, Voice calls)( . .  , i i l t t, i  ll )
Market power and enduring bottlenecks can emerge at all
layers. Legacy market power in the physical network can 






Source: Renda (2008) 
 
Below, I elaborate on each of those developments in more detail, from a layered, 
user-centric perspective.  
1.1.1 Next generation access: the gate to the ecosystem 
The physical access layer of the modern broadband platforms is traditionally 
dominated by attention towards unbundling of the incumbents‘ networks as a 
tool to boost competition in markets where the magnitude of entry barriers and 
the investment needed to replicate the access infrastructure were considered to 
be prohibitive for new entrants25. A major difference in international 
experiences can however be established between countries that could 
traditionally rely on a legacy cable infrastructure, together with a copper 
infrastructure gradually upgraded to DSL (e.g.  the United States, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark; and countries that could not rely on 
alternative infrastructures to the copper one (e.g. France, the UK, Italy and 
many others). In the former group, some countries – most notably, the US – 
have decided to move to a more lenient regulatory approach by lifting 
mandatory network sharing obligations for high-speed broadband networks; 
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others have maintained their original focus on network sharing, also due to 
constraints exerted by the EU regulatory framework in some cases. 
Today, the fact that unbundling practices must change substantially in an NGN 
environment is uncontroversial, and was confirmed by several regulators and 
field experts in the past years26. The main differences that are likely to emerge 
for what concerns the application of the ladder of investment are the following. 
First, the ladder of investment is different compared to copper networks. 
Access points and conditions of replicability change dramatically from copper to 
all-IP networks. As explained in a recent note by the EU BEREC, and 
exemplified in Figure 3 below, both the access products and wholesale products 
available to reach the access point change significantly.  
Figure 3 – The “new” ladder 
 
Source: BEREC (2010) 
 
Moreover, the functioning of the ladder depends on the type of network and the 
specific technology used. For example, in a FTTC network there is much less 
space to co-locate equipment and far fewer premises connected to each site 
compared to traditional networks, since passive access can take place at the 
street cabinet only. An Ofcom study has found that sub-loop unbundling for an 
FTTC network will increase the cost of provision by a minimum of 34% and 
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rises to 37% in the case of three additional providers27. On the other hand, 
physical unbundling for a passive optical network (PON) is hardly practical, 
though it could theoretically occur at the splitter level. The easiest case for 
unbundling can be made for the most expensive networks, i.e. p2p FTTH 
networks: however, given that required investments are very substantial, one 
may end up questioning the opportunity of mandating access to those networks.  
Against this background, the emerging approaches in countries that are 
implementing access policy for NGANs tend to focus mostly on the sharing of 
passive infrastructure, and in particular duct-sharing, rather than on active 
infrastructure sharing (such as bitstream or SLU). The scope and conditions for 
infrastructure sharing, therefore, change significantly, together with the 
conditions for effective competition between incumbents and new entrants. In 
other words, whether the investment ladder can be as effective in an NGAN 
environment, as it has proven to be in traditional copper networks, is unclear at 
best28.  
In addition, and also as a consequence of the array of available technologies, 
next generation access networks call for geographical segmentation in the 
identification and application of regulatory remedies. This increases complexity 
in the regulator‘s everyday activities, as it calls for customized remedies for 
every portion of territory. As acknowledged by the European Commission in a 
recent document, 
“The deployment of fibre networks is likely to modify the current 
network topology and access points (in particular in relation to LLU), 
thus affecting the investments made. It is necessary that NRAs adopt a 
proactive regulatory approach which promotes investment by the 
incumbent and alternative operators, whilst preserving the investments 
already made by alternative operators in LLU”29. 
This also means that the challenge for policymakers has now become essentially 
fourfold, as they must seek to: 
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 Preserve the incumbent‟s incentive to invest. Deployment of high-speed 
broadband networks is considered to provide a beneficial boost to the 
economy in terms of growth, jobs and productivity. The goal of stimulating 
investment has become even more important in recent times, as counter-
cyclical investment in broadband networks was evoked in several countries – 
plus, international competition to rank high in broadband deployment has 
become hectic.  
 Preserve the incentives of those that have already purchased LLU. Players 
that have made their way into the incumbent‘s copper network by 
purchasing access to unbundled local loop may find it very difficult to jump 
to different rungs of a different ladder, given the significant size of the 
investment already undertaken30.  
 Preserve the incentive and viability of “new new entrants”. Devising pricing 
policy aimed at providing incentives to current LLU holders to migrate to the 
next generation access network is not the same thing as providing incentives 
to brand new entrants to climb the investment ladder from scratch. This may 
create substantial problems for regulators in the first years of transition 
towards new all-IP networks.  
 Keep prices down for end consumers. At the end of the story, policymakers 
also have to ensure that whatever pricing strategy is in place, end prices for 
consumers are affordable, so that the demand for NGN subscription remains 
sufficiently high. 
Whether policymakers wishing to embark in this endeavour will be able to strike 
the balance between these four objectives, is matter for future evaluation. To be 
sure, the case for mandatory network sharing is likely to become weaker in the 
age of convergence between fixed and mobile communications, since the advent 
of 4G wireless networks promises to provide end users with a reasonably 
substitutable technology to access the Internet at sufficient speed compared to 
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xDSL or even fibre: expectations on this upcoming competition have been 
expressed in several countries31.  
The consequences of this convergence in regulatory terms are almost 
devastating for the current regulatory models. For example, fixed-line 
incumbents, or any fixed-line player that used to have significant market power 
may not be found to hold SMP anymore. This also means that the essential 
facilities nature of fixed-line networks may fade away, together with the 
economic foundations for mandatory network sharing. This is even more likely 
since the cost of deploying 4G wireless are very competitive compared to the 
cost of deploying fiber throughout national territories32. Moreover, the remedies 
that can be imposed by a regulator are not necessarily focused on access to the 
SMP player‘s network, given the diversity of the players included in the same 
market.  
1.1.2 Higher layers: where most things happen 
Higher layers of all-IP platforms have traditionally been shielded from heavy ex 
ante regulation, also since the minds that gave birth to the Internet decided to 
introduce some key rules and standards that guarantee that the network design 
remains end-to-end and based on open standards33. The most important public 
interferences of the public hand into the functioning of market and network 
forces in cyberspace are represented by competition and privacy cases at the 
application layer, and by (sometimes heavy) regulation in the content layer. 
Below, I focus on competition issues, in line with the main focus of this paper. 
The peculiar architecture of modern broadband platforms is very similar to (and 
increasingly merged with) another architecture, that of personal computers. 
Also in the case of PCs, several layers are essential to enable a quality end user 
experiences: hardware (architecture), the operating system and middleware (the 
logical layer), applications and content, plus the ability and effort of the end-
user to become familiar with the system (sometimes called ―wetware‖). Given 
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this similarity and the digital nature of these complex system goods, the 
evolution of public policy and market forces in personal computing is likely to 
be a more useful benchmark than traditional, copper-based telecoms policy to 
identify the most appropriate policy approach. In this respect, the main aspects 
that must be taken into account are the following. 
First, in the personal computing ecosystem, proprietary business models have 
always interacted with semi-open and completely open models, in a way that 
stimulated product innovation. For example, Apple‘s Macintosh adopted a 
proprietary model, where almost all complementors were built by Apple; 
Microsoft succeeded on the PC market thanks to a semi-open architecture, 
where all layers of the value chain were open to competition but one, the 
operating system, was under the control of Microsoft. Then, other business 
models emerged, which predicated full openness at the operating systems layer, 
but solve the revenues problem by tying the sale (free of charge) of the operating 
systems with the purchase of (for profit) hardware, software and/or after-sales 
services in the aftermarket. This is the case of Linux-based platforms launched 
for the server market by IBM or Novell. A few years later, similar competition 
between different business models emerged in music downloads, with Apple 
being able to launch the iTunes-iPod system mostly thanks to vertical 
integration and control over DRM standards. The evolution of digital media 
stores and the many alternative business models that are emerging testify that a 
degree of ―proprietary-ness‖ is needed in some cases to help markets take-off, 
and to convince all stakeholders involved that the model will be able to 
guarantee revenues for everybody (in the case of iTunes, the DRM was essential 
to convince the record companies to license their repertoire to Apple)34. When 
the market becomes more mature, users normally start demanding more 
openness and interoperability. This, however, does not mean that skipping 
directly to an open world is the best possible policy choice: incentives to create 
new products and services would not be sufficient in the early days of the 
industry, and the more open world may never materialise in the end without 
some degree of control of the value chain at the beginning.   
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Another important feature of the PC and Internet ecosystem is that most often, 
companies that succeed in creating an IP-based platform also generate 
substantial positive externalities in neighbouring markets. An oft-neglected 
feature of the Microsoft cases in the US and EU was that several companies that 
were involved in the facts of the case, such as application providers or OEMs 
had also enormously profited from the success of Microsoft Windows, as their 
sales had been boosted by the increase in demand for the PC system due to the 
standardization and tipping that the OS layer had gone through. The same can 
be said today for all those companies that gravitate around Apple‘s, Google‘s or 
Nokia‘s emerging platforms, which necessarily count on indirect network 
externalities to generate enough consumer demand, and accordingly open new 
markets to downstream players that can develop compatible applications (think, 
in particular, about the companies that now thrive thanks to the Apple store or 
Google Apps).  
That said, platform operators have historically been subject to rather heavy ex 
post scrutiny by antitrust authorities around the globe. Practices such as 
bundling and product integration, discrimination of downstream players and 
anticompetitive conduct while controlling a de facto industry standard have 
become commonplace in the jargon of antitrust scholars, even more in the IT 
world than they were in the brick & mortar field. Problems emerged in the 
application of the traditional antitrust rationale to cyberspace are probably still 
far from being solved. To be sure, the lessons learned in the first competition 
and merger cases on companies such as IBM, AOL/Time Warner, Intel, Oracle 
and, most notably, Microsoft are now likely to backfire on the same companies 
that promoted those cases in the first place. After the 1980s, when the attention 
of antitrust authorities focused mostly on the tangible part of computer systems, 
since the mid-Nineties the ―strongest link‖ in the value chain has constantly 
been moving upwards (or, in more traditional economic terms, downstream) in 
the value chain of modern computer systems, hitting less tangible, less 
geographically located and thus more nomadic components. This was partly due 
to the coming to maturity of certain technologies, such as mainframes, 
microprocessors and other IT equipment, which became increasingly 
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commoditized, and also due to public intervention, which aimed at breaking 
monopolies to preserve the dynamic nature of the competitive race.  
These antitrust probes have resulted in the imposition of some form of 
“neutrality” obligations on the side of successful platform operators, as 
occurred in the US Microsoft case, where the Redmond-based software giant 
was forced to treat all producers of complementors in a FRAND way after a 
complex and often tortuous investigation35. During that trial, many of the 
contradictions related to application of standard antitrust tools to the new IT 
environment surfaced, giving rise to new theories and partly amended 
theoretical frameworks in law and economics. As widely known, Judge Penfield 
Jackson even proposed, in his findings of fact, that Microsoft be split into at 
least two separate ―baby Bills‖, something that would have echoed the split-up 
of AT&T in the early 1980s, with the creation of the ―Baby Bells‖. Not only this 
did not happen at the end, but even in the telecoms field the old ―Ma‘ Bell‖ has 
been re-created almost entirely through a series of mammoth mergers during 
the past decade. And Microsoft ended up being treated as a sort of common 
carrier in the PC world, with no divestiture but a series of rules that would 
ensure the absence of discriminatory behaviour in the adjacent layers of the PC 
system. On the other hand, in Europe the Microsoft cases ended i.a. with a 
rather oddly formulated mandatory unbundling rule (in the Media Player case), 
which was later transformed into the current ―ballot screen‖ obligation (after 
the Opera case), under which Microsoft much guide end users through the 
selection of their browser product, by displaying on the user‘s screen all the 
browsers currently available, and allowing users to freely choose their most 
preferred ones.  
Now, it is still unclear if and how the ballot screen rule or similar rules will be 
applied to players other than Microsoft in the years to come. If there will be 
consistency in the application of EU antitrust rules in the future, the (eventually 
successful) attempt to break down Microsoft‘s quasi-monopoly in its layer of the 
value chain may well backfire on those that acted as Microsoft‘s key rivals in 
past years. For example, Apple‘s refusal to allow Adobe Flash-enabled 
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applications on the iPhone, iPod and iPad has already triggered protest and a 
possible antitrust investigation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act36. The day 
Microsoft decides to have its revenge, a case on the integration between the iPad 
and the Mac OS would not come unexpected. And this regardless of the fact that 
Apple holds only a tiny fraction of the smartphone market (estimated at 15%37): 
even if this (rather broad) definition of the relevant market will be adopted by 
antitrust authorities, the problem here is access to Apple‘s cloud, its very 
profitable application store that generates a fortune in revenues for both Apple 
and app developers. As in the famous US Kodak case, the fact that Kodak held a 
miserable 3% market share in the primary market (copiers, dominated at the 
time by Xerox) did not stop US authorities from condemning Kodak for 
misconduct in the aftermarket38. 
Similarly, antitrust probes are underway vis-à-vis another IT giant, Google, 
regarding its dominance in both the online advertising and in the search 
fields39. Antitrust ―enthusiasm‖ has led, for example, a US consumer association 
to advocate for the ―structural separation‖ of Google to break down the link 
between search and advertising, along the lines of the ―baby Bills‖ rationale40. 
The logic behind these calls is that, by controlling a large share of both the 
online ad and search markets, Google would be able to discriminate against 
rivals, influence consumer behaviour and collect personal data in a way that 
makes its position impossible to match for any rival, and stifles competition and 
innovation in neighbouring markets. The revolt against Google recently 
exploded in France is just another sign of the centrality that the Mountain View-
based software giant has gained in this environment; also, it is a sign of how 
contagious ex ante regulation and structural remedies can be in the digital 
arena. I will come back to this issue later on, in Section 2 of this paper.  
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1.2 Understanding the value chain  
The previous section has shown the various claims that have emerged over time 
as the development of modern IP-based platforms have led to the emergence of 
competition problems – from the regulatory holidays debate to the Microsoft 
cases, to the net neutrality debate and to the current calls for search and cloud 
neutrality. As noted in the previous pages, one interesting feature of this 
evolution is that those debates feature very similar economics and a common 
trend, from the infrastructure layer through to higher, less tangible layers. To 
some extent, this is similar to the learning process of human beings: as we learn 
how to use the letters and then the words, we forget about the technicalities and 
concentrate on gradually more sophisticated concepts41. Likewise, the 
development of IT markets is leading to an increased commoditization of lower 
layers, which become increasingly standardized and/or interoperable, and a 
shift of end users‘ attention and – consequently – of market players on higher 
layers, especially applications and content.  
The delivery of interactive content over a digital platform requires the 
participation of a number of different players situated along the value chain. 
Figure 4 below sketches the main links amongst industry players.42 Of course, 
the Figure reports generic denominations that, depending on the specific sector, 
may be replaced with more specific definitions. For example, consumers can be 
renamed as ―users‖ in communication technologies and Web-based 
environments, while it is often defined as ―audience‖ in the case of TV channels 
and radio stations, and ―reader‖ in the case of press. Similarly, the role of 
platform is attributed to entities defined as ―channel‖, ―station‖, ―newspaper‖, 
―portal‖ or ―website‖.  
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What emerges from Figure 4 is a context dominated by a plurality of markets 
and a large number of different operators. Each of the players faces specific 
challenges in operating on each of the markets.  
 Copyright owners can deliver content and applications on a number of 
alternative platforms. This can be done both by the original creator of a 
copyrighted work or by a content/application aggregator, such as a publisher 
or a collective rights organisation. In the latter case, such activity will require 
an initial investment for the creation of a broad repertoire of attractive 
content or apps. These operators can deliver content through the many 
available channels of distribution of their content, by choosing: the number 
and type of channels through which content will be made available; the type 
of license agreement with platform operators; whether to version their 
content amongst different platforms; whether to embody technological 
measures of protection (DRM) in their content etc. As will be explained 
below, convergence has made all these choices more complex. And platform 
operators also have to choose which content and which applications to allow 
on its platforms, unless it keeps the platform entirely open to third-party 
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content and applications. As an example, Apple‘s App Store for iPhone has 
evolved from a managed system into a more open system, where third 
parties can develop their own compatible apps. Openness is triggered by 
independent application aggregators, such as, i.a. GetJar, reportedly the 
world's largest independent app store, with over 50 million mobile 
application downloads per month, and supporting more than 1,800 
phones43.  
 Network operators, on the other hand, possess the technology for data 
transmission. They face high sunk investment costs for the purpose of 
developing such enabling technology and can support more than one 
platform, as is the case for TV broadcasting, where a single infrastructure 
supports a number of different TV channels, or in the case of telecom 
services, in which the ―essential facility‖ owner must allow the transmission 
of content over a number of different platforms. As will be explained in what 
follows, convergence leads most network operators to integrate vertically 
along the value chain, becoming triple-play service providers. At the same 
time, they face competition from players originally active in other domains, 
who aim at becoming platform operators and ―commoditize‖ the use of the 
network as one of the ingredients of modern platforms. 
 Consumers (end-users) choose to use the platform based on a number of 
different variables. First, they seek valuable (premium) content and killer 
apps. Secondly, they base their choice on the overall cost of system use, 
which includes the need to face additional costs to adopt a new technology 
and try to minimise the hassle of having to install a new hardware device 
(PC, decoder, console, smartphone etc.) and get familiar with its software 
and overall functioning. Thirdly, in an increasing number of cases 
consumers choose platforms that enable interactivity with both the content 
and application provider and other consumers, and as such allow for the 
exploitation of direct network effects. This occurs in the case of end-to-end 
networks, not in one-way, broadcast networks. Only the former, as a matter 
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of fact, obey to the so-called Metcalfe‘s law, according to which the value of a 
network increases exponentially as the number of users increase linearly44. 
 Advertisers provide a crucial input for most platforms, depending on the 
revenue mix model of the platform operator, that normally includes both 
revenues from subscriptions and revenues from advertising. In their attempt 
to allocate resources to maximise the ―click-through‖ ratio, advertisers 
choose those platforms by exploiting the indirect network effects, i.e. 
increasing their willingness to invest in those platforms with a large user 
installed base, a valuable repertoire of content, high-speed, reliable 
communication technologies etc. 
 
Figure 5 – Click-through rate by mobile OS, 2009 
 
 
 OEMs – Original Equipment Manufacturers – are those players that 
produce hardware complementors necessary to enable access to interactive 
content by final users. Examples include PC manufacturers, firms producing 
decoders for receiving the signal from digital terrestrial and satellite TV, 
mobile phone manufacturers etc. These players acquire the technology from 
platform operators or network operators and develop their own devices, 
often competing with rival OEMs. In some other sectors, OEMs and platform 
operators can coincide, as is the case for proprietary architectures adopted 
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by Apple for its iTunes-iPod system or for Nokia‘s Ovi. More open 
architectures have proven successful in many markets, as they enable co-
opetition and collaboration between players along the value chain. A good 
example is that of the i-Mode platform developed by Japanese NTT 
DoCoMo, based on carefully conceived revenue-mix models and billing 
systems, The i-mode platform has then been adopted by a number of 
national OEMs in the first half of this decade.  
 NRAs – National Regulatory Authorities issue licenses and authorizations 
to operate in single national markets, and are in charge of issues such as 
spectrum management and frequency allocation. They also monitor the 
conduct of market players by applying sector-specific regulations and legal 
rules and imposing sanctions. Of course, their approach to industry 
regulation affects the ability of platform operators to engage in horizontal 
collaboration with rivals and vertical collaboration with complementor 
producers, as well as in many other conducts such as price setting and price 
discrimination strategies.  
 NCAs – National Competition Authorities also affect incentives of the 
industry players and the viability of business models based on proprietary 
architectures. An example is the application of national competition rules on 
refusal to grant interoperability to rivals (at the EU level, Article 102 TFEU), 
which was the subject of recent cases at EU level (e.g. Microsoft) and 
national level (e.g. VirginMega v. Apple in France). Certainty in the 
application of competition rules at the intersection between IP and antitrust 
is key for players in this industry. 
 Finally, Platform operators are the players that provide interactive 
multimedia content to final users. Given the position they hold, they are 
called to balance the interests of different players involved in the value 
chain. Platform success crucially depends on the operator‘s ability to secure 
adequate access to dominant infrastructures, access to premium content, 
competition in the production of hardware devices, and a large customer 
installed base, such as to attract advertising investment. It is worth 
reminding that in the Internet ecosystem, everybody can become a platform 
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operator, and this is the most aggressive form of competition seen today. For 
example, Nokia – a mobile phone manufacturer (OEM) – has launched its 
Ovi platform, which competes on the market with Apple‘s and Google‘s as 
well as, potentially, platforms developed by fixed-line network operators and 
mobile operators (e.g. Vodafone).45  
Figure 6 sketches the emerging competition between different players operating 
in different markets. This emerging inter-market competition creates a number 
of teething problems for NCAs and NRAs, which often have to cope with 
industry practices in which the concept of market is blurred, some apparently 
anti-competitive practices are efficiency-enhancing, and viceversa. As a general 
remark, the main challenge such authorities have to face in dealing with 
convergence is how to create a level playing field, enabling technological 
neutrality and entry of new players in different (but competing) markets. This 
also implies removing asymmetric regulation and a careful approach to 
interoperability. In addition, inter-market competition creates a number of 
challenges for policymakers when it comes to defining the boundaries of IP 
rights. Examples are the right to deny interoperability, the right to impose DRM 
protection, whether to allow for transmission of IPR-protected content on more 
than one platform (for example, rights on football league matches already 
acquired by sat TV broadcasters but then licensed also to digital terrestrial TV 
operators and triple-play mobile service providers), and finally whether and to 
what extent to allow self-protection against p2p file sharing. 
Finally, Figure 6 also implies that regulatory symmetry is essential in order to 
ensure the level-playing field between different firms competing to become 
successful platform operators. Currently, as already explained above in this 
section, it makes a huge different whether a firm wishing to engage in platform 
competition is originally a facilities-based operator, an OS giant, a search 
champion or a vertically integrated player that couples the physical device with 
an attractive app cloud. Removing this source of asymmetry is one of the key 
challenges of policymaking in the near future.  
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Source: Author‘s elaboration 
1.2.1 Two- and multi-sided platforms 
The emerging competition between platform operators in the Internet 
ecosystem is a very complex battlefield that exhibits the typical features of a 
multi-sided market46. The successful platform operator will be the one that 
strikes the most optimal balance between the interests of all the players 
involved, including of course end users. The key steps of the development of a 
business strategy to become a successful platform operator in the Internet 
ecosystem are summarised in Figure 7 below. As shown in the picture, the first 
series of steps is the development of the operator‘s competitive capacity, 
including the content and applications that will be available on the platform, the 
needs of target end users and the overall assembling and marketing features of 
the product itself. Related steps are also the choice of a system architecture, and 
in particular the degree of openness that the market allows for – end users 
always call for more openness, all other things being equal; but end users may 
also require more safety and less malware, as well as more speed and quality of 
service when using certain applications and services. This is why managing 
users‘ expectations is a very important part of the process. 
                                                   
46 
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 28 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
Due to the complex system-good nature of emerging platforms, it is very 
unlikely that a platform operator will be able to adopt a purely proprietary and 
close architecture47. This is why platform operators also have to define an 
effective co-opetition strategy, and choose the markets in which cooperation 
with competitors will lead to standardization, and those where keeping one‘s 
own competitive advantage through proprietary choices will be the best choice. 
All this depends on the specific features of the sub-market at hand.  
All these steps contribute to the quality of the user‘s experience. But the task of 
the platform operator is not finished yet. In order to build a viable platform, the 
operator  needs to devise a smart pricing and revenue policy to keep everybody 
on board. The literature on multi-sided platforms has gone a long way in 
analysing the economics of revenue and pricing policies. Past examples such as 
the i-Mode launched by NTT DoCoMo were very important in understanding 
the role of all system participants in the development of a successful platform.  
 
 
FIGURE 7 - THE PLATFORM OPERATOR’S DECALOGUE 
1. The ―3Cs‖: content/apps, consumers, capacity 
2. Collect data on end users 
3. Create/acquire the product/content 
4. Choose a viable system architecture 
5. Create a co-opetition model 
6. Manage end user expectations 
7. Create the end user experience  
8. Formulate a pricing and bundling strategy 
9. Formulate a versioning strategy 
10. Choose the revenue-mix 
 
Source: author‘s own elaboration  
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As regards the pricing and revenue policy, the following issues must be 
highlighted. 
 First, IT platform operators often depart from standard cost-based pricing 
rules when setting the price of their multiple services. As highlighted by the 
economics literature, regardless of market power, a platform operator has, 
first and foremost, to balance the interests of the various platform users 
involves, and confront with competition and with the various users‘ 
willingness to pay. Accordingly, mobile operators use forms of metering by 
reducing the upfront payment for smartphones through handset subsidies, 
and then charging flat fees for phone usage that allow for reaching the break-
even. Similarly, Google does not charge users but organises auctions for 
placing ad spots in the paid advertising part of its search page. Examples are 
virtually endless, and echo earlier strategies adopted in more traditional 
markets, e.g. Gillette‘s pricing policy of bundling razors with blades, or 
selling razors for free to charge slightly more for the blades. The economic 
justification for metering has been explored by several authors, also in the 
case of handset subsidies48. The tendency towards adopting a non-cost-
based, carefully designed combination of flat fees and usage-based or app-
based micropayments seems to become stronger for many fixed-line and 
mobile platforms. 
 More generally, a viable pricing strategy for multi-sided platforms under 
competitive conditions may well include both price discrimination and 
versioning, i.e. differential pricing. Price discrimination, in this respect, 
entails charging different prices for similar services to different groups in 
order to extract users‘ willingness to pay – this is the well-known case of 
Ramsey pricing in economics. At the same time, differential pricing implies 
the provision of different services at different prices, with the aim to better 
match the heterogeneous preference of end users when it comes to specific 
characteristics of the service. For example, some consumers wishing to 
purchase an internet subscription may be more interested in high-QoS 
services and willing to pay more for them, whereas other users – perhaps 
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more oriented towards simpler uses, e.g. email and surfing to read the news 
– may be more interested in having a low-cost, low-QoS broadband 
connection. As in all markets, competition and the erosion of margins in the 
Internet ecosystem is expected to lead to more tailoring of platform offers for 
different types of end users49. For example, Google offers different 
conditions to advertisers wishing to appear in different places of the search 
page; pay-TV channels offer different pricing packages for different content 
packages; etc.  
 Finally, the role of advertising is key, and control of ads is essential in order 
to reap sufficient revenues and avoid charging excessive prices to end users 
or other platform users. This argument has recently been used to support the 
view that Google has an inherent advantage on competitors such as Apple in 
the development of a viable platform, due to control of mobile advertising 
revenues in the value chain50. The US FTC in any event cleared the 
acquisition of mobile advertising firm AdMob by Google exactly because 
Apple‘s recent announcement of its own iAd mobile ad service and the 
dynamic nature of the market still ensures a degree of competition in this 
region of the ecosystem. The FTC stated that ―[a]s a result of Apple's entry, 
AdMob's success to date on the iPhone platform is unlikely to be an accurate 
predictor of AdMob's competitive significance going forward, whether 
AdMob is owned by Google or not‖51. 
1.2.2 Conclusion: competing for eyeballs in the Internet ecosystem 
In the Internet ecosystem, just as Herbert Simon wrote a few decades ago, a 
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. Likewise, the convergence 
between previously separated market has created a common arena where 
players of the most disparate origin end up competing. Those that manage to 
capture the attention of end users eventually have a better chance to win the 
race. This is why some layers of the Internet ecosystem have become more 
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important than others, meaning that control of those layers is key to the control 
of user behavior and, ultimately, achievement of some degree of market power 
in the ecosystem. In the early days of personal computing, the operating system 
used to perform that function, as it was the first thing users saw when they 
switched on their PC. Today, users base their experience on different types of 
OS and demand the ability to navigate through the complexity of cyberspace 
with the help of someone that guides their choices. This is why the billing 
function and the search function have become so important. Typically, a 
platform operator will manage the full customer experience by controlling most 
of the end user‘s bill through flat pricing; alternatively, indirect network 
externalities can be exploited even more powerfully by providing a gateway 
product for free, attracting a critical mass of customers, and then reaping 
revenues through additional services, or by charging advertisers.  
Several variants of these business models have emerged in cyberspace, but all of 
them are aimed at conquering the most scarce resource of the Internet 
ecosystem: users‘ attention. This is why some commentators have used the term 
―competition for eyeballs‖ in the past few years: once the attention of end users 
has been conquered, several services, applications and content can be offered on 
the web. This is why even social networking platforms such as Facebook or 
Twitter embed the germ of market power: they are already being used as 
fabulous platforms for advertising52. And this is also why the Internet 
ecosystem, much more than an entirely ―neutral‖ network, is a ―neural‖ 
network, i.e. an ecosystem in which the main economics are dictated by the 
ability of our brain to process information, and by the modularity and path-
dependency that our brains exhibit. 
Accordingly, to conclude this brief exposition of the emerging competitive 
strategies in the Internet ecosystem, it bears observing that the degree of market 
power held by each would-be platform operator strongly depends on the 
bargaining power of players located along the value chain, which represent 
inevitable counter-parties for the platform operator. The strongest link in the 
value chain may change depending on the platform and on the business model 
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adopted, as well as on the degree of competition at any given layer. Predicting 
which layer will end up being the most important in the years to come would fall 
outside the scope of this brief illustration: the main purpose of this section, to 
the contrary, was to highlight that (i) competition in the Internet ecosystem may 
warrant a more careful, dynamic and forward-looking treatment compared to 
traditional sectors of the economy; and (ii) asymmetries in the regulatory 
treatment of players located at different layers of the value chain may result in 
distortions of platform competition, and should thus be avoided unless they are 
justified by the need to remove sources of egregious, irreversible market power, 
or refusals to supply truly indispensable assets.  
In section 2 below, we focus more directly on past, present and future gateways 
to the ecosystem.  
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2 GATEWAYS OF CYBERSPACE 
Where the confrontation between ―old-style‖ ex ante regulation and the 
economics of the IT ecosystem has reached a peak is, obviously, in those areas 
where the two worlds overlap. This typically occurs for all those services that 
become the ―gateway to cyberspace‖ for end users, i.e. the key passages towards 
applications and content that end users have to go through in order to fully 
enjoy the cyberspace experience. Landmark examples of these gates of the 
ecosystem are Internet access services, search and content aggregation 
platforms and intermediation services to provide access to application clouds. 
Below, we explore them in logical (and chronological) order.   
2.1 The telecoms-IT interface: convergence and collision 
The telecoms-IT interface became key for end users with the emergence of the 
World Wide Web in the mid-nineties. It is the most straightforward example of 
an area where the physical infrastructure – the telecommunications network – 
sublimates into the intangible Internet. As telecommunications networks 
developed the capacity to carry digitized data at high speed – the core network 
in most industrialized countries is already made of fibre – retail broadband 
access has also become the key toll to enter the ecosystem. Inevitably, this has 
potentially left telecom network operators – especially fixed-line ones at the 
outset – with some degree of control over users‘ bill and behaviour.  
Convergence became collision in 2005, when a small telecom operator named 
Madison River decided to use this degree of control to avoid that its subscribers 
could choose a competing VoIP provider (Vonage) once on the Internet. The 
famous Madison River case, ended with a negligible fine on the ISP, gave rise to 
the most furious debate ever seen in the telecoms world, especially in the US, 
where after half a decade it is still far from its final word.  
Arguments in favour of regulatory intervention to mandate full net neutrality 
and keeping telecom networks as ―dump pipes‖ developed with exclusive 
reference to the infrastructure and logical layers of the value chain, not with any 
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of the other gateways that we will be touching on in the next sections. On the 
one hand, telecom operators claimed that the impossibility to manage traffic on 
their networks would have jeopardised the quality of the user experience, 
denied the possibility of a more efficient and effective provision of the Internet 
service, and leave the whole Web prey of spam and illegal p2p file sharing, 
which – despite its illegality – continued for a long time to represent roughly 
half of the whole Internet traffic. On the other hand, ―neutralists‖ challenged 
this view by stating that the end-to-end nature of the Internet should not be 
contaminated by intelligence at the core of the network, which would reduce the 
value of the network due to filtering of content and speech and the narrowing 
down of spaces for creativity at the edges.  
Today, the debate seems to evolve towards the recognition of the importance of 
traffic management for certain, specific purposes (e.g. spam filtering), coupled 
with the definition of those traffic management practices that can be considered 
as reasonable, and under what circumstances. Most notably, there was a strong 
reaction by academics to the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published 
by the FCC in late 2009, announcing the intention to regulate ISP‘s behaviour to 
ensure the neutrality of the network, with the exception of yet-to-be-defined 
reasonable traffic management practices. As already mention in the 
introduction to this paper, the debate has also mounted in the European Union, 
both in the Commission and in the European Parliament.  
Several academics have gone back to the theory of regulation and the peculiar 
economics of the Internet ecosystem to assess the soundness of policies at study 
around the world. For example, a numerous group of academics from several 
parts of the world filed a submission with the FCC to state that, in their opinion, 
the NPRM is not grounded in economics since it fails to demonstrate the 
existence of a market failure53. At the same time, Nicholas Economides and 
Joacim Tåg (2010) analyze stylized models of two-sided markets in an attempt 
to assess the welfare effects of net neutrality, and conclude that consumers are 
unambiguously worse off under net neutrality, while the effect on platform 
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operators is ambiguous54. Also, Florian Scheutt (2010) provides an interesting 
survey of the economic literature related to net neutrality, which focuses on the 
incentive of market players to engage in the conducts that allegedly would 
compromise the viability of the Internet55. An analysis of the main economic 
features underlying the net neutrality debate is also available in Renda (2008). 
Based on existing literature, it is fair to state that the set of conditions that must 
be met in order for the net neutrality problem to emerge in the Internet 
ecosystem is much narrower than what many neutralists have argued in the 
aftermath of Madison River. More in detail, in order for ISPs to really have an 
incentive to contemplate restrictive rules to stakeholders active at higher layers, 
and for a mandatory net neutrality rule to be reasonably grounded in 
economics, the following, cumulative market outcomes would have to be 
observed: 
 ISPs must have market power in the provision of Internet access to end 
users. This is the typical problem that regulatory frameworks around the 
world have tried to solve in the past two decades through liberalization 
policies. It is also a constantly changing problem  due to increased 
competition between fixed and mobile players, as already highlighted above.  
 ISPs must also hold market power along the value chain. This means that 
they have control of their users, and can dictate conditions to players located 
at all higher layers. For example, this condition would be satisfied if a 
regulator concluded that, in the famous agreements between AT&T and 
Apple, it is AT&T, not Apple, that has the greater bargaining power. 
 ISPs must be dominant platform operators, meaning that no other platform 
governed by any other player can exert competitive pressure on the ISP‘s 
behaviour. 
 Users must be homogeneous and must not demand different quality of 
service for different prices. This means that ISPs do not increase consumer 
welfare by engaging in product differentiation and differential pricing.  
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 There are no congestion problems and all applications can easily co-exist 
on the same network. If this is the case, any traffic prioritization would 
simply be aimed at extracting more surplus from users, application 
providers or content providers.  
If all these conditions are satisfied at the same time, and for a reasonable 
amount of time in the future, then net neutrality legislation may be justified in 
economic terms. In all other cases, market failure would have to be carefully 
detailed, and in addition, governments should also show that any regulatory 
measure would perform better than what the market is already doing. It does 
not merely take a market failure (if any) to justify regulation: the absence of a 
worse regulatory failure should also be demonstrated with facts, or at least a 
credible argument. Thus, the statement of several economists, according to 
which ―While the markets at issue in this proceeding are characterized by 
product differentiation, high fixed costs and other deviations from the textbook 
model of ‗perfect competition,‘ the evidence provides no support for the 
existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type 
proposed by the Commission‖56. 
What is worse form the standpoint of economists is that regulating ex ante to 
flatten ISP practices would deprive society of an array of potentially welfare-
enhancing transactions, in which players would reach different agreement based 
on their specific needs, and would meet at different levels of quality of service 
on the Internet. As clarified by Tim Berners-Lee a few years ago, ―Net Neutrality 
is NOT saying that one shouldn‘t pay more money for high quality of service. We 
always have, and we always will.‖27 Brito et al. (2010) concur with this view – 
expressed also in Renda (2008), when they state that ―the practices that would 
be banned under the NPRM are likely, in most circumstances, to be welfare-
enhancing. While it is possible to construct theoretical models in which 
economic welfare might be harmed, there is virtually no empirical evidence that 
such harm has occurred or is likely to occur in the future. Thus, it is extremely 
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likely that the regulations proposed in the NRPM would harm consumers and 
competition and reduce economic welfare‖57. 
More in detail, the economic literature is almost unanimous in considering 
second-degree price discrimination – including the sale of a fast lane on the 
Internet – as welfare-enhancing under reasonable assumptions. Papers such as 
Lee and Wu (2009) and Kramer and Wiewiorra (2009) provide useful guidance 
in this respect. At the same time, the ISP‘s incentive to degrade the quality of 
competing products is more controversial: but this is exactly what competition 
laws are there for. In a previous paper (Renda 2008), I already explained that 
under most circumstances antitrust law is already well equipped to tackle the 
problems that may emerge in this and other markets. Regulating ex ante to fix a 
problem that is common to several markets does not seem different from 
throwing the baby with the bath water. Again, the collective submission of 
several economists to the FCC confirms this view58. 
To be sure, the debate over the need to keep the telecom pipes as dumb as 
possible is not over: many commentators, however, are starting to realize that 
the debate should be either stopped, or enlarged to all those players that play 
the role of platform operators, hold a share of the users‘ attention and, 
consequently, can affect users‘ decisions and alter competition in all 
complementary markets. It is to those players that we turn in the next sections. 
2.1.1 Google’s and Verizon’s legislative statement 
Co-regulation may happen anyway, in the shadow of the law – or, better, in the 
absence of legal certainty on what the law is. First signs of agreements along the 
value chain are coming from Google‘s and Verizon‘s joint work on net neutrality, 
which started from a shared statement of principles in October 2009 and 
evolved into a joint filing to the FCC, and was eventually translated into a 
concrete legislative proposal on August 9, 2010 (hereinafter, ―the VG proposal‖). 
The main pillars of this agreement ―across layers‖ are: (i) preserving the 
                                                   
57    
58   
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 38 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
freedom, for end users, to choose what content, applications, or devices they 
use, since ―openness has been central to the explosive innovation that has made 
the Internet a transformative medium‖; and (ii) the need to encourage both 
investment and innovation to support the underlying broadband infrastructure, 
as ―an imperative for ... global competitiveness‖. 
The statement is articulated along seven main proposals, which can be 
summarised as follows59: 
1. Users’ rights. Consumers should have the right to  
o Send and receive all lawful content of their choice;  
o Run all lawful applications and use lawful services of their choice;  
o Connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network or 
service, facilitate theft of service, or harm other users of the service. 
This also means that broadband Internet Access Providers (BIAPs) would be 
prohibited from preventing users to engage in these activities and exercise 
their freedom.  
2. Non-discrimination. A BIAP would be prohibited from engaging in undue 
discrimination against any lawful Internet content, application, or service in 
a manner that causes meaningful harm to competition or to users. 
Prioritization of Internet traffic would be presumed inconsistent with the 
non-discrimination standard, but the presumption could be rebutted. 
3. Transparency. BIAPs should inform end users of any traffic management 
practice they engage in on their networks, in order to enable an informed 
user choice.  
4. Network management. BIAPs are permitted to engage in reasonable 
network management, including technically sound practices to  
o Reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network;  
o Ensure network security or integrity;  
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o Address traffic that is unwanted by or harmful to users, the provider‘s 
network, or the Internet;  
o Ensure service quality to a subscriber;  
o Provide services or capabilities consistent with a consumer‘s choices; 
that is consistent with the technical requirements, standards, or best 
practices adopted by an independent, widely-recognized Internet 
community governance initiative or standard-setting organization;  
o Prioritize general classes or types of Internet traffic, based on latency;  
o To manage the daily operation of its network. 
5. Freedom to launch additional online services. BIAPs that comply 
with the above obligations and guarantee basic user rights can offer also any 
additional or differentiated services, separate from broadband Internet 
access, which can also make use of or access Internet content, applications 
or services and could include traffic prioritization. The FCC will monitor to 
assess whether these (arguably more innovative and less open) services 
threaten the meaningful availability of broadband Internet access services or 
have been devised or promoted in a manner designed to evade these 
consumer protections. 
6. “No wireless Carterfone”. Wireless Broadband should not be subject to 
all these rules, with the exception of the transparency principle. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office would report to Congress annually on the 
continued development and robustness of wireless broadband Internet 
access services. 
7. Enforcement: The FCC would enforce the consumer protection and non-
discrimination requirements through case-by-case adjudication, but would 
have no rulemaking authority with respect to those provisions. Parties would 
be encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution processes established by 
independent, widely-recognized Internet community governance initiatives, 
and the FCC would be directed to give appropriate deference to decisions or 
advisory opinions of such groups. The FCC could grant injunctive relief for 
violations of the consumer protection and non-discrimination provisions, by 
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imposing a fine up to $2,000,000 for knowing violations of the consumer-
protection or non-discrimination provisions. To the contrary, the FCC would 
not have any authority over Internet software applications, content or 
services. Regulatory authorities would not be permitted to regulate 
broadband Internet access service. 
A first look at the joint proposal reveal similarities, but also very significant 
differences compared to the latest policy proposals of the FCC and other public 
policymakers in other countries. While the user rights echo the Internet 
freedoms endorsed by the Federal Communications Commission already in 
2005, during Powell‘s chairmanship, the general non-discrimination obligation 
is perhaps the strongest contribution of the proposal towards an open Internet, 
and adds to the widely agreed proposal on transparency of business practices, 
which helps a more informed decision by end user when deciding about their 
Internet subscriptions.  
However, the ―open‖ provisions in the VG proposals end here: the long list of 
reasonable network management practices (including the last residual category 
where BIAP are allowed to ―manage the daily operation of their network‖) will 
have to be interpreted as an identification of the types of practices that could 
potentially lead to rebut the adverse presumption established under item 2) 
above, and not more than that – otherwise, the proposal will be considered as 
impractical by the US authorities due to an overly broad interpretation of what 
is a ―reasonable‖ traffic management practice. Also, the possibility of qualifying 
the prioritization of ―types‖ of internet traffic based on latency, although 
reasonable and very consistent with technical problems currently featured by 
broadband networks (including ―jitter‖ and micro-congestion storms) is 
certainly far from what net neutrality advocates would like to see in an FCC 
policy decision. Needless to say, also the provisions on additional online 
services and –even more – the exemption of wireless broadband are likely to 
trigger a hectic debate in the weeks to come.  
Some innovative ideas in the VG proposal are on the enforcement side. The 
proposal calls for ADR mechanisms and a swift reaction capacity of the FCC 
through the adoption of injunctive measures. At the same time, however, the 
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proposal denies the extension of FCC competence over broadband internet 
access and higher layers. Overall, the proposal restricts the FCC competence to 
overseeing compliance with (and ex post enforcement of) the non-
discrimination obligations and on the additional online services, whereas the 
GAO will oversee the development of wireless broadband platforms.  
Overall, the VG proposal seems to strike a balance between all the interests, but 
is unlikely to put an end to the debate, especially for what concerns wireless 
broadband and the additional online services. In addition, the proposal leaves 
room for interpretation as regards the types of practices that will be considered 
as ―reasonable‖, and can easily be coupled with a co-regulatory agreement on 
technical criteria to be followed for assessing whether a given practice will be 
considered as reasonable.  
In addition, the proposal will have to overcome the mounting criticism on the 
VG agreement, which has been thought to aim at the creation of a ―fast lane‖ for 
Google over Verizon‘s networks – something that has been voiced since 200860. 
In principle, the key issue to be clarified would be: (i) whether the VG ―fast lane‖ 
would belong to the additional online services mentioned in the VG proposal; 
and (ii) whether such services would fall entirely outside the scope of non-
discrimination obligations that can be enforced ex post by the FCC. If this were 
not the case, then the debate over the emergence of a two-tier Internet with a 
premium track and a ―dirt track‖ may rise again from the ashes, and become 
even more hectic than it has been so far. And the issue of whether and to what 
extent antitrust authorities would be able to step in to monitor market 
developments would come back as a key issue to be solved (see below, Section 
3.2).  
As a final remark, it must be observed that the VG proposal only addresses net 
neutrality, not neutrality versus diversity at all layers of the value chain. It 
seems, to a certain extent, still the result of a sense of urgency – i.e. reaching 
adequate legal certainty on what can constitute reasonable traffic management, 
the possibility of engaging in product differentiation between BIAPs and the 
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need to clarify that wireless is another story. Even if this is understandable after 
years of debate on net neutrality, an ideal policy initiative on those practices 
that can be considered as reasonable on the Net should embrace all players, 
including wireless players (subject to the obviously different technical features 
and congestion problems of their networks) and players active at higher layers: 
as explained in the previous sections, the neutrality v. diversity problem affects 
them just as it touches on BIAPs. 
2.2 Other key interfaces: search as the gateway of cyberspace 
Just as the provision of access to the Internet service has been considered for 
many years as the key gateway to cyberspace for end users, the increased size 
and complexity of cyberspace has led to the emergence of the search function as 
another, essential gate to the discovery of information and the realization of a 
quality end-user experience in cyberspace61. Given the over-abundance of 
information and the size of search costs for end users, a very tiny fraction of 
possible Internet uses would be possible without an adequate, effective search 
function. The need for a ―facilitator‖ that mediates between the ocean of 
information available on the Internet and the limited resources of the end user 
has materialized already in the 1990s. Think, for example, of the enormous 
success obtained by Napster, a service that was mostly limited to facilitating the 
exchange of information between peers (on ―who has what music‖ in his or her 
own hard drive)62. The issue with Napster‘s alleged vicarious liability became so 
difficult to solve under traditional copyright laws (including the Supreme Court 
precedent, Sony v. Universal studios), that in the following Grokster case the 
final Supreme Court decision had to stretch its previous interpretation of the 
law, by creating an almost brand new ―inducement theory‖ to match the 
features of the increasingly complex software programmes aimed at helping end 
users share multimedia files on the Net63. 
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The literature existing on the economics of search engines includes Fallow 
(2005) and Varian (2006), who define search as one of the key activities in 
which end users engage once they switch on their devices and start surfing. In 
particular, Varian (2006) defines search engines as two-sided markets, in which 
the revenue mix depends on the relative strength of indirect network effects 
between end users and advertisers. The higher the number of end users, the 
more profitable the sale of ad space becomes. This, to some extent, leads the 
search market to tend towards ―tipping‖, i.e. the emergence of a single dominant 
product. This is what has happened with Google in the past few years, although 
the absence of lock-in effects and learning effects may lead Google‘s position to 
be contestable. The extent of contestability depends on a number of factors, 
including the degree of multi-homing (which makes the calculation of market 
shares difficult), as well as the existence of any obstacle to the replicability of 
Google‘s offer in terms of search results and ad space.   
Moreover, competition problems may surface in case the dominant search 
engine leverages its position into adjacent markets in a way that makes its 
strategy impossible to replicate for competitors. This conduct would be very 
similar to the one attributed to Microsoft during the competition investigations 
that hit the Redmond giant during the past two decades in several regions of the 
world, and which culminated with a sort of ―neutrality obligation‖ vis-à-vis all 
complementor producers.  
In the search market, both types of problems are emerging. First, the European 
Commission has started its investigation on alleged discriminatory practices by 
Google when retrieving its search results; on the other hand, a more 
consolidated stream of investigation in the US and EU hit Google on its alleged 
dominance in the online advertising market, which – combined with its 
paramount position as a search engine – may confer the Mountain View 
company an unmatched advantage over its competitors in both markets. The 
new Head of the US DoJ Antitrust Division Christine Varney has been quite 
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explicit already in its intention to carefully look over Google, by defining 
Microsoft as ―the past‖, and Google as the present concern of US trustbusters.64 
Judging whether Google is indeed guilty of infringing antitrust laws would fall 
outside the scope of this paper. Here, I just wish to discuss some of the 
economics behind the claims that are hitting Google these days. As a matter of 
fact, in order to access cyberspace an end user needs much more than an 
Internet subscription: in an increasingly populated cyberspace, users also need 
someone to take them by the hand to navigate the conundrum of information 
available on the Net. If one player really happens to become the ―must have‖ 
search engine, then its power to steer end users‘ choices and behaviour becomes 
enormous. At the same time, players at higher layers – including vendors of any 
kind, as well as content providers – would become extraordinarily dependent on 
the dominant search engine in terms of market access, i.e. to really get close to 
end users in offering their products. That‘s why the search engine has gradually 
become an important shop window, a place to advertise and reach customers 
that has no matches in contemporary cyberspace65. According to a recent article 
appeared in the New York Times, ―Google handles nearly two-thirds of Internet 
search queries worldwide ... when Google engineers tweak its supersecret 
algorithm — as they do hundreds of times a year — they can break the business 
of a Web site that is pushed down the rankings‖66. 
Recent contributions in the literature and in the policy debate have taken a 
similar stance on the need to keep an eye on search and other functions 
alongside with the infrastructure layer. For example, Odlyzko (2009) and 
Pasquale (2008) – the latter in a Congressional testimony – concurred that 
―Just as search engines worry that cable and telecommunications carriers may 
deliberately impair quality of service in order to force application providers to 
pay for a ‗fast lane‘, content providers may legitimately worry that dominant 
search engines ‗churn‘ organic results in order to make paid ads the only 
guaranteed method of reaching customers‖. Wharton law professor Eric 
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Clemons even got as far as stating that ―Google is abusing its monopoly position 
by overcharging corporations for access to consumers [through 
advertisements]‖67.  
In a nutshell, just as monopolists in the provision of Internet access would have 
an enormous bargaining power over all players in the value chain, dominant 
firms in the provision of search services have market power vis-à-vis all other 
players if they manage to become indispensable. At the same time, application 
providers that manage to develop killer apps have a great degree of market 
power vis-à-vis other players located in the value chain: for example, the recent 
protest against Google in France, which saw major newspapers announcing the 
creation of an alternative portal where their content will be made available in 
order to avoid that Google cannibalizes their ad revenues, is telling in this 
respect, and a very open-ended story. This is why judging whether Google is 
really indispensable – and opinions, of course, widely diverge today – has 
become a central matter of current antitrust investigations68. If it is found to be 
indispensable, then it may have to behave in a perfectly neutral way (not 
discriminating between content, not prioritizing any result over others); at the 
same time, it may have to refrain from vertically integrating into other layers of 
the emerging value chain, such as applications, operating systems, and any 
other middleware, unless it provides at least equal opportunities to its rivals in 
each of the markets.  
When this happens, based on US and – even more convincingly – EU antitrust 
rules, the one in Microsoft Windows might not be the last ―ballot screen‖ we see 
mandated by trustbusters in cyberspace. Google and – as will be explained 
below – other players such as Apple – would have to always offer their users a 
choice of alternative complementors when selling a system good. This would 
mean, in turn, the triumph of neutrality over diversity and product 
differentiation. Whether this would help consumers at all, as well as contribute 
to social welfare, is something that will be discussed in Section 2 below.  
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In conclusion, when looking at the economics of complex and interconnected 
system goods, there seems to be very little room to differentiate between ISPs 
and gateway players located at higher layers. In both cases, players have an 
incentive to secure a share of the value created by the system by engaging in 
some form of differential pricing or price discrimination from their supply side, 
and in preferential agreements on the demand side. Against this background, 
players in the search market have behaved far from neutrally in the past years, 
confirming that competition for eyeballs necessarily entails attempts to 
establish links between different layers and applications to capitalise on users‘ 
attention. Google has paid a fortune to become YouTube‘s and Firefox‘s 
preferential search engine, and contributes, together with Comcast and other 
players, to the Clearwire 4G project, where all searches will be filtered primarily 
by Google itself as preferential search partner. At the same time, Google sells ad 
space through auctions that reflect advertisers‘ ―position preference‖, as 
explained by the software giant itself and by its chief economist Hal Varian in 
recent papers69.  
Like it or not, the life of a thriving, aggressively competing player in the Internet 
ecosystem is made of this. If such behavior ends up altering the competitive 
process and the level-playing field between some of the players in a way that 
creates harmful foreclosure effects in the ecosystem, this is certainly matter for 
antitrust authorities. But regulating to impose zero pricing and full non-
discrimination on the Internet is a solution in search of a problem, and a 
harmful one for the future development of the Internet ecosystem.  
2.3 Future gateways: clouds and cloud computing 
Understanding the economics of cyberspace is made more difficult by the fact 
that the architecture and business models that prevail in this fluid world change 
constantly. And, as the attention of end users shifts upwards towards less 
tangible uses, the sources of market power also shift upward in the value chain, 
with the creation of more filters and gateways that help end users reach the 
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application and content they want in the cheapest and most effective way they 
can. All this, together with the development of communication technologies and 
broadband platforms, has led to the emergence of clouds of applications, which 
anticipate what will soon become the dominant paradigm of cloud computing70.  
The key examples of application clouds that can be observed in today‘s mobile 
communications are certainly Apple and, again, Google. Apple has managed to 
develop an Application store based on its successful series of devices, such as 
the iPod touch, iPhone and iPad, and by vertical  integration, which leads to 
bundling the device with the DRM, the operating system and the service layer – 
applications are developed by several other operators, but must be certified by 
Apple on its App store. All this has led to the emergence of a system in which 
Apple effectively decides who can belong to the cloud, and who cannot. As the 
system is so peculiar that even defining a relevant market other than the system 
itself may prove difficult, it is very likely that any unjustified refusal by Apple to 
allow access to its App store may trigger antitrust complaints. A notable 
example is the complaints filed by Adobe against Apple, centred on the latter‘s 
refusal to implement Adobe Flash on its products71.  
Similar developments can be observed as regards other attempts to create 
successful platforms, such as Google‘s Android or Nokia‘s Ovi. From a more 
forward-looking perspective, a similar development is seen in the broader 
domain of cloud computing, where cloud managers will have the possibility to 
ship software as a service to end users wishing to use IT resources without 
hosting them on their servers or PCs. The fact that Google recently acquired 
DocVerse and is making its Chrome a cloud-based browser, and Microsoft is 
reportedly moving portions of its Office 2010 to a free-cloud based productivity 
platform provides some hints on where competition is headed72.  
Again, papers such as Odlyzko (2009) and others have started to assert that 
cloud computing, as an extreme form of vertical integration, may end up 
creating even stronger forms of discrimination and similarly strong calls for 
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neutrality and regulation73. Cloud providers could either exclude some rival 
applications or undesired products from their clouds, or degrade their ranking 
in the menu of available products that can be retrieved by cloud users. Whether 
this will eventually trigger the need for mandatory interoperability and 
neutrality of cloud computing, is still debated74. In any event, anticipating a 
problem like this is far from mere science-fiction: suffice it to quote Ms Varney 
again, as she said that Google‘s gathering market power in cloud computing 
could lead to a ―repeat of Microsoft‖75. Also, rumours that the upcoming 
netbooks based on Google Chrome OS reportedly will not be allowed to use hard 
drives, and Google will specify which Wi-Fi cards they support are equally 
relevant in terms of where industry architectures and openness restrictions are 
moving76.  Hh+ 
Compared to the layered architecture shown in figure 3 above, cloud computing 
proposes a system design that shifts computing resources and software 
applications to the network and data storage centres, and organises delivery 
along different modalities, which entail different degrees of control by the 
customer. The provision of platform as a service (PaaS), for example, leaves 
more control of the configuration to the client that mere application as a service 
(AaaS) or software as a service (SaaS) modes77. At the same time, private clouds 
are certainly more customized to the client‘s needs than hybrid or public clouds, 
which however enjoy clear economies of scale.  
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Figure 8 – Layers of a cloud delivery platform 
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Source: author‘s elaboration based on Renda (2009) and IBM (2009) 
 
A look at current market developments shows that some degree of 
differentiation in cloud-related business models is already taking place. In the 
domain of public clouds, commentators have been distinguishing between 
Internet clouds (e.g. Amazon), Application Clouds (Microsoft, Apple) and 
Search Clouds (Google). Other players like IBM, Oracle and Cisco are relying 
more on the hardware infrastructure as a competitive advantage in the 
provision of their cloud services.  
Overall, it is likely that the move towards cloud computing, almost universally 
acknowledged as holding an egregious welfare-enhancing potential – will 
exacerbate the convergence and system competition features that the Internet 
ecosystem already features. For example, recent antitrust investigations related 
to all layers of the value chain are all related to companies‘ competitive strategy 
towards the monetization of investment in cloud computing. These include the 
European Commission‘s investigation on IBM‘s behaviour in the mainframe 
market, the war between Adobe and Apple, and the lawsuits against Google for 
alleged discriminatory behaviour in the search domain. As big market players 
try to differentiate their products and avoid that rivals can free ride on their 
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 50 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
investment, episodes of refusal to grant interoperability or other exclusionary 
conduct are likely to become even more frequent in the years to come.  
Does this warrant any ex ante intervention to ensure cloud interoperability and 
openness? The economics behind cloud computing suggest to wait and see, as 
the two-sided nature of the clouds, the very dynamic nature of those markets 
and the sophistication of part of the demand side are likely to represent 
significant forces that push in favour of the maximum openness of the clouds in 
the long run. As often happened in the past few years, the need to create 
successful business models and to ensure security will initially call for some 
degree of proprietary-ness (as in the case of the App store), and later give 
leeway to a significant degree of commoditization of lower platform layers. In 
other words, market forces, rather than a regulator, are likely to solve the 
problem by pushing for interoperability once the market becomes more mature.  
2.4 Layered competition 
One may wonder the difficulty of an antitrust authority in having to deal with 
competition between layers. The Internet ecosystem is indeed evolving towards 
a competitive arena in which some big players, having reached a strong position 
in the provision of a key gateway service, try to extend their control over the 
value chain to secure a bigger share of the value that is created by the whole 
system architecture. This is how powerful search engines, OS vendors, 
mainframe champions, mobile operators, fixed-line broadband providers, 
microprocessor manufacturers and conglomerate producers of proprietary 
goods ended up challenging themselves on countless battlefields and with a mix 
of open, semi-open and proprietary standards. Plus, all this is happening in a 
constantly changing environment, and – even if one should resist the 
temptation to predict the future based exclusively on past experience – there is 
clear evidence that markets have been able to fix in the medium term most of 
the short-term concerns voiced by industry stakeholders. And there is also 
sufficient evidence that market developments have been quicker and more 
effective than antitrust decisions – let alone sectoral regulation – in fixing those 
problems.  
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Some of the emerging lessons for future policymaking are summarised below, 
and dealt with in more detail in the next section.  
 Convergence is leading to aggressive competition between players originally 
dominant in different relevant markets. 
 Market definition and the assessment of market power must increasingly 
take into account the whole ecosystem, and in particular countervailing 
buyer power along the value chain.  
 Multi-sidedness, multi-homing and externalities must be taken even more 
seriously when assessing the competitive effects of market developments.  
 The players that are most likely to evolve into key platform operators are 
those that, holding a gateway product, can conquer the attention of end 
users and establish a direct relationship with them. 
 Sectoral regulation that alters the level-playing field between platform 
operators is likely to stifle competition, rather than encouraging it. Countries 
that have reached a technologically neutral policy framework for modern 
broadband platforms should not allow regulatory asymmetries to persist in 
the Internet ecosystem.  
 Creating a neutral and efficient policy framework is essential for all the 
layers of the ecosystem, including the emerging cloud computing 
architecture.    
   
NEUTRALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 8/19/2010 
PAGE 52 OF 65 – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR‘S PERMISSION 
3 CONCLUSION: AVOIDING THE WINNER’S CURSE 
Faced with the magmatic evolution of cyberspace, policymakers have shown to 
be at least awkward in their response. First, they have maintained the policy 
approach to the infrastructure layer as rigidly separated from the treatment of 
other layers, in clear contradiction with the mounting evidence that market 
power, in modern broadband platforms, can and does emerge at all layer of the 
value chain, posing clear constraints on the behavior of telecom network 
operators. This is clearly visible in the US ―silos approach‖ to 
telecommunications regulation, as well as in the rigid EU approach to 
unbundling in fixed-line telecommunications. As a result, being a dominant 
network operator and internet service provider today means being clearly 
handicapped in the race to become a dominant IP-based platform, since it 
entails being subject to a series of open access obligations that other players in 
the value chain do not have. Calls for mandatory net neutrality do nothing but 
exacerbate this handicap by depriving ISPs – already challenged in their ability 
to derive revenues from Internet subscription – of the possibility to engage in 
product differentiation and extract some surplus from all the economic agents 
that will profit from the existence of its own platform.  
Second, there seems to be a hidden property in regulation, which leads it to 
spread under all circumstances. This does not necessarily mean, as Szoka and 
Thierer (2009) state, that ―regulation always spreads‖. Even without going so 
far, it is clear that, once the logic of neutrality sic et simpliciter enters the stage 
at the infrastructure layer, there seems to be no reason to confine such goal to 
the infrastructure layer only, without incurring in serious policy incoherence. 
The consequences of mandatory net neutrality, thus, are not only a likely delay 
in investment in NGNs and the prevention of welfare-enhancing transactions 
between ISPs and other players along the value chain, as demonstrated in 
Renda (2008): in addition, net neutrality at the infrastructure layer would lead 
either to an unleveled playing field (because only ISPs are forced to implement 
neutrality); or to a chilling effect on competition and innovation, due to the 
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impossibility to engage in product differentiation and launch proprietary or 
even semi-open platforms.  
Third, while the rhetoric of neutrality and compulsory licensing has focused 
mostly on externalities as a form of market failure, the economic significance of 
positive externalities has been significantly overlooked so far in the literature as 
well as in policy. Not only positive externalities are embedded in the design of 
the Internet – through the end-to-end design: for many of the stories of 
exclusionary abuses perpetrated by competitors in downstream markets – be 
they Netscape, Sun, Adobe, Skype or others – there is also a story of market 
opportunities that emerged thanks to markets that have tipped. For example, 
how much did the browser market own to the standardization – and later 
commoditization – of the OS market? How much does the server market owe to 
the client market that developed thanks to the successful product differentiation 
of leading players? To what extent the success of nomadic players like Google 
depend on the evolution of modern broadband communications that support its 
extensive suite of products? This chain of positive externalities, which can flow 
both in a bottom-up or in a top-down way, is intimately linked to the idea of 
two- and multi-sided markets, and must always be taken into account before a 
static vision of the antitrust (or worse, regulatory) problem is adopted.  
Finally, an even more evolutionary approach to modern, layered IP 
architectures suggests that players wishing to enter the market at all layers may 
soon develop an expectation of future regulation in case they win the race to 
become dominant. This equates to stating that, in sectors with strong network 
externalities and where competition ―for‖ the market takes the form of a 
winner-take-all game, winners will be ―cursed‖, as they would have to share 
their prize with losers and with everybody who wants to share. Suffice it to go 
back to Judge Learned Hand‘s famous statement in Alcoa, ―the successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he 
wins‖: there‘s no reason to conclude differently for cyberspace.  
As a result, there is reason to believe that calls for ex ante regulation imposing 
neutrality at any of the layers of modern IP-based platforms are very 
unfortunate and should be carefully avoided. To the contrary, protecting users 
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in cyberspace means being so brave to reflect carefully on how antitrust rules 
should be adapted to new markets, and possibly made more effective and 
timely. At the same time, it means understanding that whatever policy approach 
is adopted, it must be a layered approach, as well as a co-regulatory one: public 
policymakers, being less informed than market players, should limit themselves 
to facilitate the respect of given outcomes on the Internet, without engaging in 
the regulation of technical aspects that are likely to become obsolete in just a 
few weeks. 
Below, I reflect on a specific set of issues that may warrant the attention of 
policymakers in the years to come. These include the layered approach to 
policymaking, co-regulatory solutions, antitrust aspects, and the importance of 
countervailing buyer power. I conclude by advocating for changes in the current 
regulatory framework for e-communications regulation in the US and in the 
European Union. 
3.1 Step 1: a layered, co-regulatory approach to policymaking 
The concept of Internet ecosystem embeds the existence of several inter-
dependencies in the different zones and layers of what constitutes the modern 
cyberspace. These layers and inter-dependencies are also doomed to change 
over time, and certainly as cloud computing becomes more widespread.  
The main feature of a layered approach to policymakers is the attention for 
preserving the business case for investing in new platforms and engaging in 
product differentiation without stifling other players‘ incentives to invest. In 
this respect, a layered approach to policymaking postulates that any policy 
approach adopted at a given layer of the value chain – besides being firmly 
grounded in competition economics – should take into account the existing 
policies adopted at other layers of the IP-based architecture. For example:  
 If regulatory holidays are implemented at the infrastructure layer, allowing 
for a degree of concentration in that layer and (absent competitive pressure 
from wireless platforms) more limited choice of broadband subscriptions for 
end users, then a greater degree of openness can be required at higher layers, 
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in order to give all operators active at higher layers effective access to end 
users. 
 At the other extreme, if national policymakers decide to move towards the 
functional separation of the telecoms network (as, for example, in the UK, 
Sweden, Italy and other European countries), imposing full net neutrality 
obligations also at the higher layers simply means killing the market. In such 
a situation, no player will invest in NGNs, as there will be no possibility of 
monetizing such investment by asking any price to any player. The only 
consequence of such an approach will be an attempt to recover all costs by 
raising the price of internet subscriptions for end users – something that may 
even lead to calls for retail regulation at the very end.  
 In most circumstances, the role of the policymaker will be to strike a 
reasonable balance at each of the layers, by deciding on the most appropriate 
policy at the infrastructure layer (based on established competition policy 
rules) and then fine-tuning policy at higher layers in order to preserve a 
reasonable balance between sustainable long-run competition and incentives 
to invest. For example, when competitive pressure exerted from alternative 
DSL operators, cable operators and/or 4G wireless platforms is not 
considered significant, it may be reasonable to impose open access 
obligations on a fixed-line incumbent, provided that access charges 
reasonably remunerate the incumbent for its risky investment and uncertain 
demand conditions. At the same time, a risk premium on NGN access charges 
may not be sufficient is net neutrality is mandated at the higher layers, and is 
likely to lead to significant delays in the migration towards all-IP broadband 
platforms.  
A similar rationale applies to players at higher layers of the value chain. 
Whatever obligation is imposed ex ante or – better – ex post on any dominant 
player along the value chain, it should be adequately justified in terms of 
efficiency and proportionality – meaning that no less intrusive regulatory or 
antitrust remedy would prove as effective. In all circumstances, adopting 
structural remedies such as the separation of business operations and any form 
of divestiture should represent the exception rather than the norm, especially in 
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a domain in which policymakers can hardly predict the consequences of their 
regulatory intervention.  
The latter observation leads to identifying another desirable trend in the policy 
approach to cyberspace: the adoption – where possible and appropriate – of co-
regulatory solutions by all players on the value chain. In particular, some 
commentators have argued in favour of co-regulation as a way to solve the 
never-ending net neutrality debate.78 This solution may be viable especially if 
coupled with the definition of users‘ rights at a higher policy level. This way, the 
regulation of cyberspace may become increasingly similar to the so-called ―new 
approach‖ to standardization policy at the EU level, which combines a definition 
of outcomes by policymakers, as well as a definition of means and standards by 
market players.  
3.2 Step 2: competition rules and policy coherence at all layers 
One of the hot issues surrounding the international debate on neutrality and 
diversity in the internet ecosystem is whether the general principles that will be 
adopted to govern the behaviour of all players on the value chain should 
originate in the antitrust laws, and whether competition authorities should be 
allowed to monitor those markets and intervene where needed. I this respect, 
the VG proposal is very US-centric, as it empowers the FCC to monitor 
compliance with the non-discrimination obligations, but says nothing about the 
FTC and the Department of Justice. As a matter of fact, established Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in the US denies the possibility of ex post antitrust scrutiny 
where there are overlaps with the competence of sectoral regulatory 
authorities79. This means that there would still be a split competence over the 
Internet ecosystem, with the FCC monitoring ISP behaviour at the 
infrastructure and logical layer, antitrust authorities being in charge of 
overseeing business conduct at the application and content layer, and the GAO 
in charge of reporting what type of control should be performed on wireless 
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operators. This might create, in the long run, problems of policy coherence, and 
may hamper attempts to create a unique set of principles to be followed 
throughout the ecosystem, as well as technology neutrality and the long-term 
sustainability of the policy in place.  
At the same time, in the EU the application of antitrust rules is always possible 
at all layers of the value chain, whereas the telecoms package applies only to 
network operators, and currently bears a bias in favour of a separation between 
fixed and mobile markets. The recent Guidance document issued by the 
European Commission on the treatment of exclusionary abuses under article 
102 TFEU provides some guidance on how behaviours by players at all layers of 
the value chain will be treated. In particular, the definition of anti-competitive 
foreclosure given in the Guidance is based on two main pillars: in order for a 
conduct to be considered as exclusionary under Article 102 TFEU: (i) there must 
be evidence of actual or likely foreclosure of as-efficient competitors from a 
given relevant market; and (ii) the conduct should be harmful for consumers. 
Absent any of these two requirements, the conduct will be found lawful. In 
principle, the telecoms package (as recently updated in 2009) should embed 
these principles: in reality, this is not the case, since national regulatory 
authorities can and do intervene ex ante in a much broader set of 
circumstances, which applies only to network operators and not to players that 
belong to other layers of the value chain.  
In summary, both in the US and the EU there seems to be a problem of policy 
coherence and equal treatment of platform operators in the Internet ecosystem.  
3.3 Step 3: Reflecting on the goals of competition policy 
In addition, antitrust enforcement carries the following, structural problems 
when applied to the various layers of the Internet ecosystem: 
 Market definition is increasingly difficult, due to technology convergence, 
fixed-mobile substitution, platform competition, competition ―for‖ the 
market, network externalities and tipping, which lead to equating the market 
with the de facto industry standard in some parts of the value chain.  
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 The definition of market power depends on the countervailing power of 
players located at other layers, more than in traditional ―brick & mortar‖ 
sectors, where buyer power is less frequently considered as a key variable in 
the assessment of market power80. Even in those markets, specific attention 
has been given in some legal systems to big multi-product distributors such 
as supermarket chains, as warranting special attention in the assessment of 
market power of even big players in the upstream markets81. 
 Some of the tools used to detect the abuse of market power, such as the 
Lerner index, become meaningless in large areas of the Internet ecosystem, 
both due to the fact that marginal costs are negligible in higher layer, and 
because the multi-sided nature of these markets call for a departure from 
cost-based pricing regardless of the extent of market power.  
 Some of the standards used to define anti-competitive conduct need to be 
clarified. This is, in particular, the case of the ―new product screen‖ and, 
more generally, the cumulative conditions for a refusal to supply to be 
considered abusive under EU competition law.82 At the same time, the 
treatment of vertical agreements (under Art 101 TFEU when applied in the 
EU) must be clarified when applied to this field, especially when it comes to 
possible neutrality problems83. Finally, the role of tying and bundling in the 
Internet ecosystem must be subject to a careful rethink, due to the role of 
these tools in the competition for eyeballs.  
 Antitrust enforcement is too slow. Given its ex post nature, as well as the 
various degrees of judgment before a decision ultimately becomes effective, 
antitrust enforcement often comes too late, giving market players the 
opportunity to prefer infringement over compliance, and then face antitrust 
scrutiny as an inevitable ―tax‖. This form of gambling with the regulator has 
become more widespread in markets where the first-mover advantage is 
essential, as is typically the case in the IT world.  
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Even more generally, there seems to be a general need to reaffirm that 
openness, even if undoubtedly a fascinating and attractive word, cannot be a 
goal of public policy in and of itself, let alone antitrust law. Openness should be 
pursued to the extent that it proves beneficial to consumers and thus 
contributes to social welfare in the long run compared to any other alternative. 
For example, in a recent article Rosston and Topper (2010) provide an antitrust 
analysis of the wireless net neutrality obligation (but a similar rationale could be 
replicated for fixed-line), and find that imposing net neutrality would amount to 
a per se rule on vertical agreements in mobile platforms, something that has 
long been discarded in antitrust laws, given the welfare-enhancing nature of 
many vertical agreements in most markets84.  
So, if openness is not a good guiding principle for policymaking, what can such 
principle be? While the protection of long-run consumer welfare as a proxy for 
total welfare is an established principle in antitrust enforcement worldwide, the 
intermediate goals that help the maximization of consumer welfare are way less 
clear in the Internet ecosystem. The following principles will likely become 
increasingly relevant in the years to come: 
 The protection of the end-to-end design of the Internet has been evoked as a 
way to preserve its long-term sustainability. This does not amount to 
mandating net neutrality: a network can be end-to-end and still entail QoS 
differentiation to allow for a suitable customer experience; 
 Competition as a process, rather than as a pluralistic outcome, has been 
considered as more appropriate for a dynamic environment with high fixed 
costs (in some of the layers) and strong network externalities85.  
 Dynamic competition as the preservation of incentives to invest in new 
platforms is a different standard than the preservation of incentives to invest 
in new products or services that belong to existing platforms. In other words, 
antitrust authorities may have to reflect on whether the role of antitrust is 
forcing intra-platform competition (and thus decisions on the system 
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architecture), rather than preserving the possibility for entry of new 
platforms in the market.  
3.4 Conclusion: smart regulation in the Internet ecosystem 
Whatever policy framework is chosen to ensure the preservation of competition 
in the Internet ecosystem, the standards followed must comply with better 
regulation criteria. This means, i.a., that public intervention should be: 
 Efficient. This means that remedies must address a clear market failure, and 
must be justified in terms of net benefits for consumers and society as a 
whole. This, in turn, means proving that there would be no government 
failure that is worse than the market failure it is supposed to address (―the 
cure is not worse than the disease‖).  
 Proportionate. This means that remedies must be proportionate to the goals, 
and avoid the creation of unnecessary constraints or costs on the Internet 
ecosystem. It also means that authorities prove that no less intrusive 
alternative may achieve the same result.  
 Coordinated. The core of the technical information in the Internet ecosystem 
rests with private players that animate this environment. Once public goals 
have been established, wide co-regulatory solutions may be the best way to 
solve the policy problem technically. As explained above, cooperation 
between public and private players should become the norm in the 
authorities‘ everyday monitoring of the ecosystem.  
 Layered. The effects of the policy in the medium to long-term must be 
shown with respect to all the players that operate in the various layers of the 
Internet ecosystem, from a dynamic and forward-looking perspective.  
 Coherent. Whatever policy remedy is considered by public authorities, the 
level-playing field between platform operators competing across the value 
chain should not be altered by asymmetric regulatory treatment.  
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